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“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own
times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty
as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a
claim to liberty must be addressed.”1
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1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (emphasis added).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court described a troubling “discord between the Constitution’s
central protections and a received legal stricture” in its 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges.2 Its decision in Obergefell resolved that discord in the
context of the right to same-sex marriage. Unfortunately, that same discord
remains in the context of marriages and other intimate relationships fraught with
domestic violence because police protection for victims in these relationships is
still not recognized as a due process interest. The Supreme Court faced this issue
in its 2005 decision Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, but it declined to recognize
due process property rights for domestic violence victims based on police
inaction.3 The right to police protection, as Justice Kennedy explains in
Obergefell, is a right inextricably linked with the other fundamental rights
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom
from domestic violence is a fundamental human right,4 and the Supreme Court
should recognize it as an aspect of due process liberty, just as it does the right to
marry. The due process analysis in Obergefell enables the Supreme Court to
overturn its decision in Castle Rock.
The Supreme Court held in Castle Rock that there was no due process violation
by the Colorado town’s police force for its failure to enforce a domestic violence
restraining order against Jessica (Ms. Lenahan) Gonzales’s estranged husband,
Simon Gonzales.5 The Court declined to recognize the individual rights
arguments advanced by Ms. Lenahan in her due process claim.6 After Ms.
Lenahan took her case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”), however, the tribunal granted her claim of relief against the United
States in 2011.7 The resulting decision repeatedly stressed the concept that
freedom from domestic violence, in numerous iterations, is a basic human right.8
Still, claimants who approach federal courts seeking redress for harms that arise
2. Id.
3. 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802–03, 2810 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that a State shall not ‘deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.’Amdt. 14, § 1. In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress has created a federal cause of action for
‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’ [The
victim] claims the benefit of this provision on the ground that she had a property interest in police
enforcement of the restraining order against her husband; and that the town deprived her of this property
without due process by having a policy that tolerated nonenforcement of restraining orders” and holding
that the victim “did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police
enforcement of the restraining order against her husband.”).
4. See, e.g., City of Baltimore resolution, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/womenandjustice/upload/
2b-Baltimore-MD.pdf; Pres. Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation: National Domestic Violence
Awareness Month, 2014, THE WHITE HOUSE, (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/30/presidential-proclamation-national-domestic-violence-awareness-month-201.
5. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
6. Id.
7. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11 (2011).
8. Id.
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from domestic violence have not been able to rely on the IACHR decision
because Castle Rock9 was a United States Supreme Court decision and thus
controlling authority.
In this article, I argue that the legal landscape is now entirely different as a
result of the reasoning in the Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell.10 The decision
struck down the Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee laws11 defining
marriage as being between one woman and one man. The Court’s reasoning in
Obergefell clarifies that the freedom to marry regardless of gender, and its status
as part of the more comprehensive right to privacy, is inextricably linked with the
other fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause. The following
sections will explain that these legal findings articulated in Obergefell now
provide the infrastructure upon which domestic violence victims can frame
causes of action as due process liberty violations. The IACHR framed the
violations in the Castle Rock case as failures by the government to meet its
obligations with due diligence to protect Ms. Lenahan and her children from
discrimination and harm.12 Ms. Lenahan’s action in the Castle Rock litigation
was an entitlement-based due process property claim.13 The Supreme Court now
has the authority to overturn, or at least decline to follow, not only Castle Rock’s
finding regarding Due Process but also the precedent relied on by its majority.14
Section II of this article examines the facts and findings in the 2005 Castle
Rock decision, including the Court’s refusal to recognize a Due Process-based
entitlement claim to police protection in domestic violence cases. It also
introduces DeShaney v. Winnebago, a key precedent the Court relied on when
9. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
10. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
11. See id. at 2584 (citing the laws in question which were an Ohio statute, and state constitutional
provisions in the other three states, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Mich. Const., art. I,
§25; Ky. Const. §233A; Tenn. Const., art. XI, §18).
12. See Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, Sections IV(6)(B)(1)(c)(iii) and V (2011) (concluding that “even though the [United States
government] recognized the necessity to protect Jessica Lenahan and Leslie, Katheryn and Rebecca
Gonzales from domestic violence, it failed to meet this duty with due diligence . . . which constituted a
form of discrimination in violation of Article II of the American Declaration [on the Rights and Duties of
Man, which guarantees freedom from discrimination], and that “the [United States government] also
failed to undertake reasonable measures to prevent the death of Leslie, Katheryn and Rebecca Gonzales
in violation of their right to life under Article I of the American Declaration, in conjunction with their
right to special protection as girl-children under Article VII of the American Declaration. Finally, the
Commission concludes that the State violated the right to judicial protection of Jessica Lenahan and her
next-of-kin, under Article XVIII of the American Declaration.”).
13. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005) (stating that “[t]he procedural
component of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit’.
‘To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire’
and ‘more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it.’” (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
14. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755 (2005) (declining to find a due process
liberty violation and citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989),
which held that nothing in the Due Process Clause requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors).
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declining to find liability based on a due process liberty interest. Section III
explains the 2011 decision by the IACHR, which found that the U.S. government
had committed numerous human rights violations against Ms. Lenahan. Section
IV looks at the Obergefell decision and explains how it is consistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence on due process liberty, with the IACHR’s Lenahan
decision, and with other international human rights laws. Finally, Section V lays
out the specific reasons why both Castle Rock and DeShaney can be overturned.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, DUE PROCESS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2005: TOWN OF
CASTLE ROCK V. GONZALES
In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Castle Rock that a police department’s
refusal to enforce a domestic violence restraining order against Jessica Lenahan’s
husband, Simon Gonzales, did not constitute a due process violation.15 The
underlying incident resulted in the deaths of Ms. Lenahan’s three young
daughters16 after their father abducted them from the yard at the mother’s
residence, drove them around for several hours, and eventually showed up with
their bodies at the Castle Rock police department.17 Despite numerous calls from
Ms. Lenahan during the ten hours between the abduction and the shoot-out, the
Castle Rock Police Department took no action and repeatedly told Ms. Lenahan
to wait to see if Gonzales brought the children home, even after one of her reports
provided the department with Gonzales’s whereabouts based on his own phone
call to her.18
The Court declined to recognize the Due Process arguments Ms. Lenahan
made in her claim.19 As explained in more detail below, the due process claim
was limited to a property-based entitlement claim because Supreme Court
precedent disallowed due process liberty claims in cases against governments
15. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
16. See Declaration of Jessica Ruth Lenahan (Gonzales), Exhibit E in Observations Concerning the
September 22, 2006 Response of the United States Government at 5–34, Gonzales v. United States,
Petition No. 1490-05, Inter. Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.128, doc. 19 (2007)
(Dec.11, 2006) (explaining that “[a]fter nine years of marriage, Jessica and Simon Gonzales separated in
January of 1999. Remaining in the custody of their mother were their three young daughters; Rebecca
(age 9), Katheryn (age 8) and Leslie (age 6)”), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/gonzales_
finalbrief.pdf.
17. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales at 755–56.
18. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales at 753–54; see also, Petition Alleging Violations of the
Human Rights of Jessica Gonzales, by the United States of America and the State of Colorado, with
Request for an Investigation and Hearing of the Merits at 7–20, Gonzales v. United States, Petition No.
1490-05, Inter. Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.128, doc. 19 (2007), https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/field_document/petitionallegingviolationsofthehumanrightsofjessicagonzales.pdf
[hereinafter Gonzales Petition]. For a full factual description, see Observations Concerning the
September 22, 2006 Response of the United States Government at 5–34, Gonzales v. United States,
Petition No. 1490-05, Inter. Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.128, doc. 19 (2007),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/gonzales_finalbrief.pdf.
19. Id. at 768–69.
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where private actors also caused harm.20 Ms. Lenahan’s lawsuit claimed the
mandatory arrest language in the restraining order entitled her to law enforce-
ment protection, but the Supreme Court disagreed; it reasoned, “[w]e do not
believe that these protections of Colorado law truly made enforcement of
restraining orders mandatory.”21
The Castle Rock Police Department could have enforced the restraining order
based on Gonzales’s violation of the stay-away provisions in coming to Ms.
Lenahan’s home, as well as the restricted child visitation aspect he violated by
abducting the girls on a day he did not have visitation.22 Gonzales was abusive
toward, and dangerous to, his estranged wife and their children for years prior to
his separation from them, and he attempted suicide at least once in front of the
children.23 Further, Gonzales fired a gun numerous times during the incident,
eventually killing himself at the police station.24 There was gunfire by the police
as well, and the precise causes and times of death of Ms. Lenahan’s daughters
remain unknown—raising further questions about the police conduct that night
that may never be fully answered.25
Despite the compelling facts of this case, which Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion acknowledged are “horrible,”26 the Supreme Court held that there was no
obligation on the part of the police to respond in a manner that could have
20. Id. at 755–56, 767–68 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989), which held that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee due process liberty to the extent of creating an entitlement
of government assistance to accessing all aspects of freedom, in a case where a family claimed child
protective services workers failed to keep a child they were involved with from being beaten nearly to
death by his father).
21. See Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Gonzales v. U.S.: An Emerging Model for Domestic Violence and
Human Rights Advocacy in the U.S., 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 184 (2008) [hereinafter Bettinger-
Lopez] (explaining that “Jessica Gonzales [Lenahan] filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against the police in
federal court, alleging due process violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Before reaching discovery, her case was dismissed. The case wound its way up to the Supreme Court,
where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that Ms. Gonzales [Lenahan] had no personal
entitlement under the Due Process Clause to police enforcement of her restraining order . . . . [d]espite
the Colorado legislature’s repeated use of the word ‘shall’ in the mandatory arrest law . . . .”) (citing
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005)) (emphasis in original).
22. See Gonzales Petition, supra note 18, at 8 (explaining that [o]n May 21, 1999, Ms. Gonzales
applied for and obtained from the Douglas County, Colorado District Court a temporary restraining order
[(“TRO”)] against Mr. Gonzales”).
23. Id. at 9 (noting that a state court “made permanent the temporary restraining order” and solidified
visitation terms for Simon, on June 4, 1999, which was just two weeks prior to the incident when the
children died).
24. See Gonzales Petition, supra note 18 at 7–20.
25. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 21, at 184 (explaining that the precise causes of death of Ms.
Lenahan’s daughters is unknown, because the local authorities failed to investigate it—a point stressed by
the IACHR opinion—and that Simon Gonzales initiated the exchange of gunfire with the Castle Rock
police after stopping his truck—with the girls inside—at the police station); see also, Margaret Drew, Do
Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer’s Duty to Warn in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
447, 470 (2006) (explaining that “suicide by cop” and self-inflicted fatal wounds are not unheard of in
domestic violence cases, particularly in the case of the family annihilator.”).
26. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005).
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prevented the girls’ deaths. This holding precluded any relief for Ms. Lenahan,
whose claim framed the police inaction as impinging on her entitlement to
protection from harm.27 The entitlement claim was articulated as a due process
property rights violation. As a consequence of the Court’s 1989 decision in
DeShaney v. Winnebago, due process property claims are the only relief available
to redress harm by state actors under similar facts where third party acts were also
involved.28 The Court in DeShaney held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
create an entitlement of government aid in order to realize all the advantages of
freedom.29 The Court also opined that the Due Process Clause is intended to
prevent government from abusing its power or employing it as an instrument of
oppression.30
DeShaney, as interpreted by Castle Rock to include domestic violence harms
involving police, rendered due process liberty claims based on domestic violence
facts, such as those in Castle Rock, impossible. Castle Rock held that due process
property claims for such domestic violence deaths were also not permitted. In
light of Obergefell’s extensive analysis on the nature of liberty, however, claims
with similar facts became legally viable under the more appropriate due process
liberty analysis. The subsequent legal history of the Castle Rock case at the
IACHR provided further legal authority that, while not binding, should be
deemed persuasive in concert with Obergefell. The points made regarding due
process liberty in the IACHR decision and in Obergefell are strikingly similar.
III. CASTLE ROCK REVISITED: THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ON DUE PROCESS
In 2011, the IACHR in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States of
America, found that the United States government had violated Ms. Lenahan’s
human rights.31 The decision arose from litigation Ms. Lenahan filed with the
Inter-American Commission several years after the Supreme Court’s Castle Rock
decision.32 The human rights clinics at the University of Miami and Columbia
University law schools as well as the American Civil Liberties Union, repre-
sented Ms. Lenahan, who claimed that the Castle Rock police and the federal
courts had violated her human rights to police protection from domestic
violence.33 Her petition alleged that the Castle Rock Police Department’s failure
27. Id. at 768.
28. Id. at 755 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
29. 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11 (2011).
32. Gonzales Petition, supra note 18.
33. See Human Rights Clinic Victory for Gonzales, University of Miami School of Law Human Rights
Clinic, University of Miami School of Law, LAW.MIAMI.EDU, http://www.law.miami.edu/hrc/hrc_gonzalez_
usa.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (explaining the law school clinics’ representation of Gonzales-
Lenahan before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
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to protect Ms. Lenahan and her children and the federal courts’ subsequent
refusal to provide her with a remedy, constituted human rights violations.34
The IACHR holding was starkly different from the Supreme Court’s 2005
decision, which denied Ms. Lenahan’s procedural due process claim against the
town of Castle Rock.35 The IACHR decision repeatedly stressed the concept that
freedom from domestic violence, in numerous iterations, was a basic human
right.36 Ms. Lenahan’s counsel specified that the IACHR decision was a
“challenge” to the doctrine established in DeShaney that state actors bear no legal
duty to shield citizens from third party harms.37 Ms. Lenahan urged the IACHR
to “hold the United States to well-established international standards on state
responsibility to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish human
rights violations and protect and compensate victims.”38 The IACHR agreed that
Ms. Lenahan’s human rights to be free from discrimination, to equal protection
before the law, to police protection against domestic violence, and to judicial
remedies were violated. The commission chastised the United States for gaps in
its domestic violence policies and laws and discussed extensive recommenda-
tions for change.39
In the IACHR’s Lenahan decision, the Commission outlined recommendations
for U.S. legal reform, which included legislative measures to enforce the
mandatory character of restraining orders.40 The Lenahan decision should
increase the already growing influence of international law in American courts,
and as the Commission noted with admonishment, the United States needs to
provide legal remedies for domestic violence victims in order to comply with
global standards.41 The United States would risk compromising our status as an
international leader on social and economic policy if it ignored the clear
directives in Lenahan. The IACHR decision is an opportunity to help United
34. Gonzales petition, supra note 18, at 46, 65.
35. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); see also Int’l Comm’n Finds U.S.
Denied Justice to Domestic Violence Survivor, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/international-
commission-finds-united-states-denied-justice-domestic-violence-survivor (explaining that “the commis-
sion’s decision stands in stark contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Castle Rock v.
Jessica Gonzales (2005), where the justices ruled that Ms. Lenahan (then Gonzales) had no constitutional
right to police protection, and that the failure of the police to enforce Ms. Lenahan’s order of protection
was not unconstitutional. Lenahan then filed a petition against the U.S. before the IACHR, alleging
violations of international human rights.”).
36. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11 (2011).
37. See Human Rights Clinic Victory, supra note 33 (stating that “the case before Commission
challenged the core principle of US law (embodied in DeShaney v. Winnebago County) that government
generally has no duty to protect individuals from private acts of violence.”).
38. Id. (also noting that amicus briefs were submitted for petitioner signed by “over 70 individuals and
organizations, and Professor Jeffrey Fagan submitted an expert report about the appropriate standards for
police response to domestic violence in the U.S.”).
39. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11, Sections IV and VI (2011).
40. Id. at ¶ 201 (4) (2011).
41. Id. at 181–84 (2011).
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States courts better account for international standards in future analyses,
particularly in the area of human rights.42
The United States Supreme Court has increasingly relied on international
sources as part of its analyses.43 Although the Court’s reliance on foreign and
international law has been criticized by advocates, scholars, and even some
justices, its efficacy is clear. The U.S. legal system, especially as a framework for
remedies for victims of domestic violence, should recognize freedom from
domestic violence as a human right in the context of due process liberty.44
IV. THE SUPREME COURT, DUE PROCESS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2015:
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES
The extensive holdings and commentary in the IACHR’s Lenahan decision
provided important supplemental legal authority but were not binding precedent
on United States federal and state courts. Obergefell, however, is binding
precedent, making it a game-changer for domestic violence plaintiffs who seek
redress against state actors. Obergefell expands the Supreme Court’s Due Process
Liberty interpretation. As I explain in this section, the Court’s findings in
Obergefell were in line with its evolving body of law on due process liberty and
with the IACHR’s decision in the Lenahan case. Furthermore, the Court has
relied on international legal authority in previous cases, and by using the
IACHR’s Lenahan findings to overturn Castle Rock, the Court could restore
42. See, e.g., KSM Carlson, International Commission Decision Brings New Hope to Native Women
Facing Domestic Violence in the U.S., TURTLE TALK (Aug. 18, 2011) (quoting Juana Majel Dixon,
National Congress of American Indians 1st Vice President and Co-Chair of its Task Force on Violence
Against Women) (explaining that “The recommendations to the United States send a strong message that
immediate action is needed to fix systemic failures in the way protection orders are enforced in the U.S.
and to reform federal law to protect all women, including Native women, from violence.”); see also,
Leigh Goodmark, The Economics of Violence: Why Freedom from Domestic Violence must be Treated as
a Developmental Right in International Law in Kelsey S. Barnes 6 YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 97
(1997–98) (arguing that “domestic violence is [ ] a public health concern that imposes a great economic
burden on communities . . . . [T]o truly affect policy and gain governmental support, activists must show
the enormous economic and business loss that domestic abuse engenders. Only then can the human rights
argument be argued successfully . . . . While no treaty—the foundation of international law—specifically
singles out freedom from domestic violence as a right, many scholars make cogent arguments that
existing treaty language implicitly includes such a right. In addition, mainstream discussions occurring in
organizations around the globe acknowledge the horrors of domestic violence. For example, a 1995
United Nations publication noted that, contrary to previous reviews, most countries now include reports
about violence against women in their communications with the United Nations. As a result, many
countries view this problem as having been ‘largely recognized.’ Even the World Bank, for the first time
ever in 1993, assessed the health consequences of gender-based violence.”).
43. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (outlawing the death penalty for juveniles
and noting that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”); see also Section V(B) infra.
44. See, e.g., Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United States’
Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71,
76–77 (2004) (explaining that “the United States’ interpretation of the [United Nations Convention
Against Torture] through the lens of the more public male experience, too often leaves refugee women
unprotected from less public harms such as domestic violence.”).
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consistency with the United States’ domestic and international policy goals. As a
result, the Supreme Court has the legal authority to overturn Castle Rock when
faced with an appropriate claim against a state actor in a domestic violence case.
The United States Supreme Court clarified more than just the right to marry in
Obergefell, a landmark 2015 decision on state same-sex marriage laws.45
Obergefell recognized a due process liberty right in freedom to marry those of the
same sex.46 The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy also clarified the modern
understanding of due process liberty as an enforceable legal right necessary for
social justice. Kennedy’s opinion included an impassioned description of due
process liberty rights as an intrinsic aspect of our very existence as humans.47 The
Court recounted the history of marriage and the laws governing it, noting not just
how marriage has evolved but that its very evolution is emblematic of our
strength as a society.48 After reviewing the death of the coverture doctrine and the
now defunct role of parents in arranging U.S. marriages, the Court stated:
These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of
marriage. Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteris-
tic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to
new generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or
protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial
process.49
The Court then immediately drew a parallel between the transformation of
marriage laws and the evolving social status of gays and lesbians to make the
point that such an evolution necessitated legal change.50 The Court went on to
state: “This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experiences with the rights of
gays and lesbians.”51 The Court’s reasoning laid the jurisprudential groundwork
for ensuing legal developments in rights for LGBT individuals as well as married
couples.52
45. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
46. Id.
47. See id. at 2598–99 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 386 (1978) to describe the right
to marriage, stemming from due process liberty, as “‘one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men’”; and noting that the Court said it “would be contradictory ‘to
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.’”).
48. Id. at 2595.
49. Id. at 2596.
50. Id. at 2596–97.
51. Id. at 2596.
52. See, e.g., Jeremiah Ho, Animus and Dignity: Justice Kennedy’s Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Obergefell v. Hodges, JURIST (July 22, 2015), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/07/Jeremiah-Ho-Obergefell-H
odges.php (explaining that “the animus-dignity propagated in these gay rights cases has established a
correlative effect between the two concepts that elevates the connection into an anti-stereotyping
principle or channeling device. The connection shows us what is wrong with the way the law has been
used to marginalize a sub-group in society based on disapproval for a characteristic that members of this
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The Obergefell majority described the due process liberty implications of the
right of intimate association—which was found in the Supreme Court’s 2003
decision, Lawrence v. Texas,53 to include same-gender sexual partners—as
distinct from, but linked to, the right to marriage freedom.54 The Court stressed
that both interests—the right to marry and the right of intimate association—are
inherent in due process liberty and must be protected.55 As the Court explained,
“while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to
engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow that
freedom stops there.”56 Although the Court was referring specifically to the right
of marriage as an expansion of the right to intimate association, it is noteworthy
that the Court discussed this separate liberty interest within its discussion of
marriage freedom as a liberty interest.57 Ultimately, liberty interests in the family
context are understood to be related to the right to privacy.58 Those Due Process
rights embody the human right of freedom to bodily and psychological integrity
in our personal lives. The Court has repeatedly stressed these concepts in the line
of cases running from Meyer v. Nebraska59 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,60
which dealt with parental decision-making for educating their children, Griswold
v. Connecticut61 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,62 which recognized contraceptive
freedom, to Roe v. Wade’s reproductive choice decision63—all of which are cited
by the Lawrence Court in its discussion of due process liberty jurisprudence.64
sub-group possess. The connection then highlights how that marginalization pervasively hinders
members of the sub-group’s ability to lead their lives according to our collective beliefs of
self-determinism, freedom and individuality. That correlative effect offers potential furthering advances
in sexual orientation antidiscrimination, the next realm for gay rights advocacy.”).
53. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
54. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
55. See id. at 2600 (insisting that marriage freedom includes the right to marry the partner of one’s
choosing, regardless of gender, partly because our understanding of the nature of liberty described in
Lawrence confirmed the right to sexual activity with partners of one’s choosing without risk of criminal
sanctions, stating that: “Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise
of liberty.”).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, The Undetermined Legacy of ‘Obergefell v. Hodges’, THE NATION (June
29, 2015) http://www.thenation.com/article/the-undetermined-legacy-of-obergefell-v-hodges/ (explain-
ing that “[t]he single most important theme in the opinion is that the Constitution provides not merely
space but also support for expanding the perimeters of human rights. Obergefell recommits the Court to
an understanding that ‘the nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times’ and that
the framers ‘entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as
we learn its meaning.’ Its grace note is the reminder to evolve.”).
58. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 575 (explaining the rights to privacy and liberty established in
Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe).
59. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
60. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003).
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As the Court explained in Lawrence:
[H]ad those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.
Castle Rock sets a precedent of absolving police forces of virtually all liability.
This oppresses domestic violence victims who have relied on police protection to
their detriment. Future petitioners/plaintiffs could challenge Castle Rock’s
holding by basing their claims on the more palatable—and sensible—legal
framework of due process liberty.
A. OBERGEFELL IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON DUE
PROCESS LIBERTY
Since the 1930’s the Court’s jurisprudence on due process liberty evolved and
eventually acknowledged that Due Process must recognize our humanistic
obligations to each other. This is particularly profound in the context of state
involvement in intimate relationships, generally understood as family and
individual privacy cases.65 One example is Stanley v. Illinois66 Mr. Stanley’s
children were automatically placed into foster care by Illinois state authorities
after their mother died, simply because Mr. Stanley—their biological father with
whom they had lived along with their mother—had not been married to her.67 The
Court held that Illinois deprived Mr. Stanley of Due Process on liberty grounds
and that states could not separate unmarried fathers from their children without
parental fitness hearings.68
The right to family privacy as a liberty interest, as explained in Stanley and the
Court’s related Due Process cases should be recognized in domestic violence
redress claims. Ms. Lenahan was deprived of a due process liberty interest,
similar to the deprivation that Mr. Stanley suffered. Furthermore, the Gonzales
children were deprived of their right to life. The IACHR extensively discussed in
Lenahan that this deprivation was a human rights violation.69 The IACHR in
Lenahan found unequivocally that the Supreme Court of the United States erred
65. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
66. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
67. Id. at 646–47.
68. Id. at 657–58.
69. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11, ¶ 164 (2011).
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in Castle Rock and that the mother was entitled to a remedy through the courts.70
The Obergefell decision is a potent explanation of the Court’s modern jurispru-
dence on due process liberty and privacy.71 A modern understanding of due
process liberty must be deferential to the right to freedom from domestic violence
and state protection from it when court-ordered. This is also consistent with the
legal doctrine of human rights, which is increasingly recognizing state obliga-
tions to act with due diligence.72
B. OBERGEFELL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS’ LENAHAN DECISION AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAWS
In future cases of police failure to protect victims from domestic violence, the
Court’s family privacy jurisprudence must be considered alongside Obergefell.
Simultaneously, though, the Court should consider the findings in Lenahan
concerning the United States’ duties under the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man73 and other iterations of international human rights
law, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (“CEDAW”).74 The Court could also draw from scholarship on
the issue of human rights and fundamental liberties in domestic violence cases75
as supplemental authority. The IACHR in the Lenahan decision provides a
roadmap for the United States legal system’s approach to redress for domestic
violence victims. The Obergefell analysis of due process liberty is resonant with
70. See Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, Section VII ¶ 209 et seq. (2011).
71. See Section IV(A) infra, explaining the evolution of the Court’s due process liberty jurisprudence
as rooted in the right to privacy, and discussing the line of family privacy cases including Meyer, Pierce,
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe.
72. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid & Debra J. Liebowitz, Due Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its
Power and its Perils, 48 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 301, 302 (2015) (stating that “[i]nternational human rights
bodies and some States’ national courts now recognize the due diligence principle in their decisions and
policy discourse”); Sarah Rogerson, Domesticating Due Diligence: Municipal Tort Litigation’s Potential
to Address Failed Enforcement of Orders of Protection, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 289, 296
(2012–13).
73. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11, Section V ¶ 199 et seq. (2011).
74. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 21 at 188, 190 (explaining that although the United States has
declined to ratify CEDAW and “most international human rights treaties,” the Lenahan “case has
presented new approaches to human rights, civil rights, and domestic violence advocacy in the United
States”).
75. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States & Collective Entity
Responsibility for Gender-Based Violence, 21:2 AMER. UNIV. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 244–45
(2012) (discussing the European Court of Human Rights’ treatment of state actors as responsible in
certain domestic violence cases if they should have known harm could result); Martha Davis, Human
Rights in the Trenches: Using International Human Rights Law in “Everyday” Legal Aid Cases,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. L. POL’Y 414, 414 (2007) (explaining that “international human rights law is
increasingly used in domestic advocacy.”); Alma Luz Betran y Puga et al., Foreword: Gender Justice in
the Americas: A Transnational Dialogue on Violence, Sexuality, Reproduction and Human Rights, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 751 (2011).
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the international human rights theory articulated persuasively in Lenahan. The
Supreme Court could play a critical role by using Obergefell and Lenahan in
concert to overturn Castle Rock. In the meantime, lower federal courts could tee
up the issue by recognizing that freedom from domestic violence is a fundamen-
tal human right76 guaranteed by our Constitution’s promise of due process liberty.
The human rights law upon which the IACHR relies in Lenahan has the same
theoretical framework as our domestic due process liberty principles. However, it
is promulgated in the international treaty as the American Declaration on Rights
and Duties of Man. The provisions of this Declaration apply to countries,
including the United States, that are signatories to the Charter of the Organization
of American States.77 It is well settled in the cases decided by the IACHR, and the
closely related Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that the Declaration
contains binding international obligations for the countries belonging to the
Organization of American States (“OAS”).78 This is true even if a nation has not
ratified the OAS’s more detailed 1978 treaty, the “American Convention on
Human Rights,” which the United States has not.79
United States law has historically declined to acknowledge legal rights and
liberties as human rights issues, as contrasted with international law, particularly
in the domestic violence context.80 However, a growing body of domestic and
76. In the wake of the Lenahan decision, domestic violence legal advocates lobbied city councils
across the country to pass resolutions declaring freedom from domestic violence is a fundamental human
right, and achieved results in numerous cities. See JoAnn Kamuf Ward and Erin Foley Smith, Freedom
From Violence: A Fundamental Human Right, CITIESFORCEDAW.ORG (Oct. 3, 2014), http://citiesforcedaw.
org/freedom-from-violence-a-fundamental-human-right/. For example, on Monday, March 19, 2012, the
Baltimore City Council passed a resolution finding that freedom from domestic violence is a fundamental
human right and pledging to continue to secure that right on behalf of Baltimore’s citizens. MIAMI LAW
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & COLUMBIA LAW HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, RECOGNIZING FREEDOM FROM DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT: LOCAL RESOLUTIONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES, BWJP.ORG
14, http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/recognizing_freedom_from_domestic_violence_as_a_
fundamental_human_right.pdf (last updated Jan. 24, 2013).
77. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 21, at 186 (explaining that although the United States has not
ratified the American Declaration it has signed the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, and
“signatories to the Charter (including the U.S.) are legally bound by the Declaration’s provisions, and the
Commission has consistently applied ‘general obligations’ principles when interpreting the wide
spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Declaration.”); see also,
Gonzales petition, supra note 18 at § I(D) (asserting that the American Declaration is binding on the
United States because it is an OAS member state).
78. Id. But see Rogerson, supra note 72, at 297 (stating that “the [United States] government has a
history of ignoring [Inter-American] Commission [on Human Rights] decisions, ‘arguing that it is not
bound to comply with the decisions of such international human rights bodies,’ which indicates that none
of the traditional compliance incentives are appealing to the United States government.”).
79. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 21, at 185, 188 (explaining that “the U.S. has not ratified any
Inter-American human rights treaties,” including but not limited to, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and that the U.S. government uses the strategy of
attaching condition-laden RUD’s to the “few [human rights] treaties it has ratified.”). The United States
has also declined to ratify major human rights treaties such as the United Nations Declaration on Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. See Davis, supra note 75, at 423–24.
80. Cantalupo, supra note 75, at 237–38.
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international law recognizes the abuse of women as a human rights violation.81
One of most important legal developments was the international jurisprudence
recognizing that positive obligations can flow from negative rights.82 Kenneth
Roth, Director of Human Rights Watch, explained, “when a state makes little or
no effort to stop a certain form of private violence, it tacitly condones the
violence. This complicity transforms what would otherwise be wholly private
conduct into a constructive act of the state.”83 The concept expressed by Roth is
grounded in the doctrine of due diligence.84
The concept of a state’s due diligence in domestic violence situations began to
emerge in international domestic violence cases in 1988. It recognizes the
governmental responsibility to protect its citizens from gender-based violence,
including domestic abuse.85 This view was first seen in Velazquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras,86 which involved the abduction and disappearance of a female
graduate student. The court held that “[t]he failure of the state apparatus to act is a
failure on the part of Honduras to fulfill the duties it assumed under the American
Convention on Human Rights.”87 The court further explained that an illegal act
“which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to the
state can lead to international responsibility of the state, not because of the act,
but because of the lack of due diligence.”88 The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and other
international tribunals continued to develop the due diligence standard in
domestic violence cases.89 Notably, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women stressed that due diligence by state actors against
81. See, e.g., Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 72, at 306 (asserting that “[t]he focus on
implementation of human rights norms is the result of a maturing international system, one that is
increasingly attentive to the gap between de jure and de facto human rights protections as well as the role
of the international system in ensuring the fulfilment of human rights.”); ZOE CRAVEN, Human Rights and
Domestic Violence, AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.adfvc.unsw.
edu.au/PDF%20files/human_rights.pdf.
82. Lee Hasselbacher, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of
Human Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 190, 192 (2010); see also Joel A. Hugenberger, Redefining Property in Due Process: Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales and the Demise of the Positive Law Approach, 47 U.B.C. L. REV. 773 (2006).
83. See Hasselbacher, supra note 82, at 192 (citing KENNETH ROTH, Domestic Violence as an
International Human Rights Issue, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 326, 330 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994)).
84. Id.
85. See Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 72 at 304–05 (explaining that due diligence includes an
“amplified notion of State obligation in cases where a ‘State’s indifference provides a form of
encouragement and/or de facto permission’ for gender violence. The ‘due diligence’ principle is now
generally understood to include an obligation on the State to prevent, protect against, prosecute, punish,
and provide redress for acts of violence against women.”).
86. Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
87. Id. at ¶ 182.
88. Id. at ¶ 172.
89. See Cantalupo, supra note 75, at 238.
588 [Vol. XVII:575THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW
domestic violence was a necessary part of customary international law.90
The Court should consider these human rights principles of international
law—and the Lenahan decision specifically—when it has the opportunity to
revisit the Castle Rock decision. In previous cases, the Court has relied on foreign
legal authority and international law in several different ways. For example,
turning our attention again to the Lawrence decision, which overturned the Texas
anti-sodomy statute outlawing homosexual (but not heterosexual) acts of
sodomy, the Court used foreign legal authority to help disprove the state of
Texas’s case theory.91 The Court used a due process liberty analysis, and in
finding that the alleged state interest was invalid, relied in part on English law for
the proposition that sodomy has not actually been legally proscribed, as Texas
state officials claimed it had been throughout modern civilization.92 In Roper v.
Simmons, decided two years after Lawrence, the Court outlawed the juvenile
death penalty, noting that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions.”93 Further, in 2010, Graham v. Florida94 found life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles in non-homicide cases to be unconstitutional. The
Court, in this case, chastised the states for being out of step with the vast majority
of foreign nations which long ago rejected such criminal penalties. The Court
explained:
There is support for our conclusion in the fact that, in continuing to
impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit
homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected
the world over. This observation does not control our decision. The
judgments of other nations and the international community are not
dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. But “‘[t]he
climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a
particular punishment’” is also “‘not irrelevant.’” . . . The Court has
looked beyond our Nation’s borders for support for its independent
conclusion that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual . . . . The
question before us is not whether international law prohibits the United
States from imposing the sentence at issue in this case. The question is
whether that punishment is cruel and unusual. In that inquiry, “the
90. See Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes
and Consequences, ¶¶ 49, 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/27 (June 10, 2005) (by Rashida Manjoo),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx (explaining that “[s]tate
obligations regarding the problem of violence against women include the duty to act with due diligence in
responding to this human rights violation, and the obligation to ensure adequate and effective access to
justice” and discussing “the link between the duty to act with due diligence and the obligations of States
to guarantee access to adequate and effective judicial remedies for victims and their family members.”).
91. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003).
92. Id.
93. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
94. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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overwhelming weight of international opinion against” life without
parole for nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles “provide[s]
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” . . . The
Court has treated the laws and practices of other nations and
international agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not
because those norms are binding or controlling but because the
judgment of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is
inconsistent with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the
Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to support it.95
Similarly to its analysis in Graham v. Florida, the Court could use the
international consensus of what constitutes a human rights violation as a tool in
its own reexamination of due process liberty claims against state actors. Using
the Lenahan case and international human rights law principles to overturn
Castle Rock would not just be sound jurisprudence, it would also be consistent
with the United States’ domestic and international policy goals.
For example, in 2012, the Obama Administration issued an executive order
describing the nation’s strategy to end violence against women globally and
denounced gender-based violence as “a human rights violation or abuse.”96 The
United States Department of State and the United States Agency for International
Development articulated a comprehensive “global strategy” to address violence
against women.97 The global strategy document focused mainly on bad acts
committed by non-U.S. individuals and groups, including state actors, outside the
U.S. borders, but also clearly acknowledged that “regardless of the form that
gender-based violence takes, it is a human rights violation or abuse, a public
health challenge, and a barrier to civic, social, political, and economic participa-
tion.”98 The State Department’s strategy document recommended the devotion of
significant intellectual, legal, and economic resources to attack gender-based
violence outside U.S. borders, but the federal government has continued to
denounce domestic violence stateside. On September 9, 2014, the twentieth
anniversary of the passage of the Violence Against Women Act,99 President
Obama released a Presidential Proclamation, which “reaffirm[ed] the basic
human right to be free from violence and abuse.”100 Whether or not the United
95. Id. at 80–82 (emphasis added); see Ken I. Kirsch, The Supreme Court and International Relations
Theory, 69 ALB. L. REV. 771 (2006) (discussing ways that international currents have influenced the
Supreme Court).
96. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 77 Fed. Reg. 49345 (2012).
97. USAID, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE GLOBALLY, 3 (Aug. 2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
196468.pdf.
98. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
99. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013).
100. Pres. Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation: 20th Anniversary of the Violence Against
Women Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/
09/presidential-proclamation-twentieth-anniversary-violence-against-women-a.
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States government took such actions in response to the Lenahan decision is
impossible to discern with certainty, but the Lenahan legal team’s goals of
recalibrating “norms, standards and policies” that proclaim intolerance of
violence against women are closer as a result.101
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S CASTLE ROCK AND DESHANEY DECISIONS CAN
BE OVERTURNED
The Court overruled itself in Lawrence v. Texas,102 overturning the decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick.103 The Obergefell Court acknowledged this reversal by the
Court and used it as an example of the Court’s evolving jurisprudence, which
appropriately recognizes social changes as well as decisions by the Court that
permit discrimination.104 The IACHR in Lenahan105 directly criticized the
Supreme Court’s DeShaney106 decision, which is the most relevant authority the
Supreme Court relied on in Castle Rock.107 The Court could reverse itself by
recognizing a claim for relief under similar facts based on a due process liberty
argument. It is important to review the analysis in DeShaney, which the Castle
Rock Court deemed a total bar to claims for domestic violence victims against
police where third parties have contributed to the harm.108
101. See Bettinger-Lopez, supra note 21, at 192–93 (discussing “The Case as a Tool for Political
Pressure” and specifying advocacy strategies to reframe “norms, standards and policies” about
gender-based violence in the United States after the Lenahan case in which she represented the
petitioner).
102. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–77 (2003).
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
104. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (explaining that the “Court first gave detailed
consideration to the legal status of homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick . . . [when] it upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia law deemed to criminalize certain homosexual acts. Ten years later, in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), the Court invalidated an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution
that sought to foreclose any branch or political subdivision of the State from protecting persons against
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Then, in 2003, the Court overruled Bowers, holding that laws
making same-sex intimacy a crime ‘demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.’ Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 575.”).
105. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11 (2011).
106. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
107. See 545 U.S. 748, 755, 768–69 (2005) (relying on DeShaney in its holding).
108. See Joel Teitlbaum, et al., Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales: Implications for Public
Health Policy and Practice, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 337, 338 (2006) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
1525280/ (explaining that “[a]s Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the DeShaney decision, ‘[n]othing in the
language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security . . . . [I]ts language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State’ . . . . Even more than DeShaney perhaps,
Castle Rock involved a law whose express purpose was to protect a specified class of persons—women
and their children who were the victims of violence. But the Court followed the DeShaney lead, despite
the differences in the underlying legal protections at issue . . . . The policy and practice lesson to be drawn
from all of this is that if a legislature expects unconditional government protections—be it law
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A. THE DESHANEY ANALYSIS: NO LIBERTY INTEREST IN STATE PROTECTION
AGAINST PRIVATE HARMS
In Deshaney109 a father beat his child nearly to death after a child protective
services investigation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that nothing in the Due
Process Clause required the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors.110 The majority opinion reasoned that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not create an entitlement of government aid in
order to realize all the advantages of freedom.111 The Court conceded, however,
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent abuse of state power or
the use of that power as an instrument of oppression.112 The state actors—in this
case, police and child social workers with prior knowledge of the father’s
abuse—were not deemed liable because the father himself was not a state actor,
and the child was not in the custody of the state.113
1. DeShaney’s Factual History
The facts in DeShaney bear many similarities to those in Castle Rock. Both
cases involve extreme physical harm—death in the Castle Rock case—resulting
from inaction by a state actor, as well as lawsuits seeking redress for that harm by
the family members of the injured persons.114 Both cases also involve a family
history of physical abuse by third parties, whose acts ultimately caused the death
of or physical harm to the claimants’ family member(s). In DeShaney, the father
gained custody of his child after a divorce in Wyoming and then moved to
Wisconsin.115 In 1982, the father’s second wife complained to police that the
father was abusing the child, and although the father was questioned, the state
took no further action.116 In 1983, the child was admitted to the hospital with
bruises and abrasions, resulting in the formation of a “Child Protection Team,”
(hereinafter, “team”) which found insufficient evidence to retain the child in the
custody of the court.117 The team recommended enrolling the child in a
pre-school program, counseling for the father, and encouraging the father’s
girlfriend to move out.118 One month later, the child was again treated at the
hospital, after which the hospital notified the team.119 The caseworker decided
enforcement or medical care rights—it must write laws that express this unambiguously and it must also
unambiguously imbue protected persons with the legal right to seek redress when these protections are
not accorded.”).
109. 489 U.S. 189.
110. Id. at 195.
111. Id. at 196.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 190.
114. See id. at 189; Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 767 (2005).
115. Id. at 191.
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not to take action.120 In subsequent visits over the next several months, the
caseworker noticed many issues such as a suspicious injuries on Joshua’s head
and that Joshua had not been enrolled in school.121 She documented these issues
along with the fact that father’s girlfriend had not moved out.122 After noting
these issues, the caseworker again did not take action to inform the Department of
Social Services that the father was in breach of the voluntary agreement to fulfill
the recommendations of the team.123 Ultimately, in March 1984, the father beat
the child into a life-threatening coma, causing injuries necessitating the child’s
permanent institutionalization.124 The facts of DeShaney and Castle Rock are
similar in their results: death or extreme physical harm, and in the causation of
that harm, inaction of state employees who were being relied upon for protection.
2. DeShaney’s Legal Analysis
The petitioner in DeShaney claimed a breach of substantive, rather than
procedural, Due Process rights.125 The petitioner argued that the state had an
affirmative duty to act under the Due Process Clause because the police actually
undertook to protect the child from danger and, therefore, there existed a special
relationship between the child and the state.126 The Court analyzed several
precedential cases, including Youngberg v. Romeo, which held that when a person
is institutionalized and wholly dependent on the state, there is an affirmative duty
to provide certain services and care, and Estelle v. Gamble, which confirmed the
state’s affirmative duty to provide basic needs to prison inmates in state
custody.127
The DeShaney Court explained that a state violates the Due Process Clause
when it affirmatively restricts an individual’s freedom of physical movement and
fails to provide him basic needs.128 The Court ultimately concluded, however,
that the duties in Youngberg and Estelle were not present in DeShaney because
the father was not a state actor, and the child was not in the custody of the state.129
It conceded the possibility that the state was liable under state tort law but not
under the Due Process Clause.130 As Justice Brennan explained in a vigorous
dissent, however, the focus of the Court should be on the actions that the state of
Wisconsin took, not the actions they failed to take.131 Brennan argued that the
120. Id.




125. Id. at 195.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 198–99 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976)).
128. Id. at 189–90.
129. Id. at 190;.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 205.
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Estelle and Youngberg precedents demonstrated that a state does have an
affirmative duty to provide aid in some cases.132
In Youngberg, for example, a man with an IQ of between eight and ten was
hospitalized.133 The fact of hospitalization was essential, not because it rendered
Youngberg helpless, but because it separated him from other sources of aid that
the Court held the state was obligated to replace.134 Justice Brennan explained in
his DeShaney dissent that the Court should not limit the protections in Youngberg
to individuals under the direct physical control of state actors.135 Rather, Brennan
opined, these protections should extend to “[t]he State’s knowledge of an
individual’s predicament and its expression of intent to help him [, which] can
amount to a limitation on his freedom to act on his own behalf.”136 Justice
Blackmun agreed. Joining Brennan’s dissent and adding his own, Blackmun
argued that the state’s intervention triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy
once the state learned of his predicament.137 Notably, Blackmun called for a
“sympathetic” reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in language seeming
prescient of Justice Kennedy’s in Obergefell, he urged reasoning which
“comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion
need not be exiled from the province of judging.”138
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE “NO DUTY” RULE: CASES ALLOWING RECOVERY AGAINST
STATE ACTORS UNDER THE STATE-CREATED-DANGER DOCTRINE
The federal circuit courts seem to follow Blackmun’s and Kennedy’s
principles of justice with compassion, even with DeShaney and Castle Rock
intact. Those courts have allowed two very narrow exceptions to the general
principle that a state has no affirmative duty to provide aid and have found the
state to be liable in some cases.139 The first exception is recognized, but not
followed, in DeShaney: “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding
duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”140 The
second is known as the “State-created-danger” exception, which the Sixth Circuit
described as follows: when the State “cause[s] or greatly increase[s] the risk of
harm to its citizens . . . through its own affirmative acts,” it has established a
“special danger” and a corresponding duty to protect its citizens from that risk.141
132. Id.
133. Id. at 206.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 207.
137. Id. at 212.
138. Id. at 213.
139. See generally id. at 194–99.
140. Id. at 199–200.
141. Koulta v. Merciez, 477 F.3d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no due process violation in a case
where police officers had asked a drunk woman to leave the premises without performing a field sobriety
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In order for the state to be liable a plaintiff must show: (1) an affirmative act by
the state which either created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be
exposed to an act of violence by a third party; (2) a special danger to the plaintiff
wherein the state’s actions placed the plaintiff specifically at risk, as distin-
guished from a risk that affects the public at large; and (3) the state knew or
should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff. 142
Other circuits have similar variations of the State-created-danger doctrine.143
In cases decided after Castle Rock, circuit courts found liability for state actors’
roles in harm resulting from intimate partner violence.144 In a Third Circuit case,
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, a 911 operator (and co-workers) used the 911 call
system to gain unauthorized information about the 911 operator’s ex-girlfriend
and her new boyfriend.145 The operator, who appeared to be in a volatile state,
was fired.146 The operator’s boss contacted the police about a possible threat, but
he failed to contact the police in the town of the operator’s ex-girlfriend.147 The
operator ultimately killed his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend.148 The Third
Circuit held that only a misuse of state authority, rather than a failure to use
authority, amounts to a Due Process violation.149 Thus, inaction was not enough
to constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. The court found that there
was no sufficient “affirmative act” by the 911 operator’s boss in order to create
state liability.150 However, the acts of the co-workers that helped the operator
obtain the unauthorized information were different. Their behavior, the court
found, satisfied all of the following elements of the Third Circuit’s State-created-
danger test: (1) the harm ultimately caused to the plaintiff was foreseeable and
fairly direct; (2) the state actor acted in willful disregard to the plaintiff’s safety;
(3) there was some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; and (4) the
state actor used his authority to create an opportunity for danger that otherwise
test. The woman drove her car while intoxicated, killing another driver). The court first said there was no
affirmative act by the state, which created or increased the risk. The court then focused on the question of
“whether the victim was safer before the state action than he was after it.” The failure to do a field
sobriety or Breathalyzer test may have been negligent, but it did not create or increase the risk of harm.
Further there was not a risk of harm to an identifiable victim; rather the harm was to the public at large.
The court found there was no substantive due process violation. Id.
142. Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cartwright v. City of Marine City,
336 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2003)).
143. See, e.g., Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dept., 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming
the state created danger doctrine in a case where a drunk man froze to death after officers kicked him out
of a bar on a cold night without a jacket. The court found that the district court erred in finding that the
officers did not affirmatively place the drunk man in a position of danger).
144. Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 240 (3d Cir. 2008).
145. Id.at 228–229.
146. Id. at 229.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 235.
150. Id. at 239.
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would not have existed.151 As a result, the court found that the district court erred
in dismissing the state created danger claims against the co-workers.152
In Okin v. Village of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Department,153 the Second
Circuit examined the State-created-danger doctrine. The underlying facts in-
volved a woman who consistently reported her husband’s abuse to police. The
police officers, however, were rude to her and overtly friendly with her alleged
abuser.154 The trial evidence included several documented notes showing annoyance,
mocking, and hostility by the police toward the complaining woman.155 She claimed
that the police behavior violated her substantive due process rights.156
The Second Circuit reviewed precedent which had held that it is a violation of
substantive due process rights when officers condone the illegal behavior of the
private actors.157 However, that earlier holding had since been limited to include
only affirmative conduct, rather than passive failures to act to stop illegal
activity.158 The circuit court in Okin therefore found that the officers’ being
friendly with the husband and talking sports with him did not amount to “explicit
assurances” that the aggressor would not be arrested for any abuse.159 The court
did, however, reverse the district court for failing to consider whether the trier of
fact could find the officers’ conduct to be implicit but still affirmatively
encouraging the aggressor’s domestic violence.160 The court found that a
reasonable fact finder could find that the police officers acted implicitly and
affirmatively encouraged the aggressor’s behavior.161 The willingness of the
circuit courts to uphold the State-created-danger doctrine in police-involved
domestic violence cases showed the federal courts’ general propensity to hold
state actors to a standard of responsibility for protecting victims.
DeShaney has not been a bar to recovery in those circuit court cases, and it
should not be a bar to recovery for any domestic violence victim seeking redress
in federal court for harm caused by police failure to protect. Because Obergefell
clarifies the right to due process liberty, DeShaney’s and therefore Castle Rock’s
narrow reading of it should be overturned.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasoning used in the circuit court cases under the State-created-danger
doctrine is the same reasoning urged by the dissents in DeShaney and Castle
151. See id. at 235.
152. Id. at 243.
153. 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009).
154. Id. at 420–21.
155. Id. at 425.
156. Id. at 434.
157. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993).
158. Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 418–19 (2d Cir. 1998).
159. 577 F.3d at 429.
160. Id. at 429–30.
161. Id. at 430–31.
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Rock, as well as the IACHR in Lenahan. It is also the same reasoning used by
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell to explain the necessity of preserving liberty in
marriage and other intimate matters.
In each of these decisions, the legal analysis is built upon the same foundation:
the principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court’s reasoning in Castle Rock ignored those principles to an extent
that defies logic. It is remarkable that a victim like Jessica Lenahan was forced to
seek recourse in an international tribunal for the blatant refusal of her local police
force to protect her from the violent loss of life that she suffered. The next federal
claim by a victim whose suffering is ignored or increased by police inaction
should be fast-tracked to the Supreme Court, which should stand ready to reverse
its decision in Castle Rock and hold police accountable.
The appropriate inquiry in such cases must be whether the fundamental liberty
interest in freedom from domestic violence has been compromised by law
enforcement. As the Court clarified in Obergefell, ours is “a Nation where new
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through
perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political
sphere and the judicial process.”162 The Court should ensconce in Supreme Court
jurisprudence the dimension of freedom from domestic violence as a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Our legal system was significantly
influenced by Blackstonian precepts, such as the “moderate correction” and
“coverture.”163 In this concept Blackstone urged husbands to visit upon their
wives.164 Blackstone emphasized the concept of “coverture” which devalued
women as mere chattel.165 In a nation where just a few decades ago marital rape
remained legal in several states,166 surely we can quiet the pleas and protests for
good.167 The Supreme Court should crystallize a new dimension of freedom, as
clarified so eloquently in Obergefell,168 for victims of domestic violence by
overturning Castle Rock and guaranteeing them the protections from law
enforcement that due process liberty demands.
162. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (emphasis added).
163. William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND Vol., 1 at 442–45 (1765).
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 62 N.Y.2d 251 (1984) (outlawing marital rape in New York, one of
the last states to do so).
167. See, e.g., Deborah Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly
National and the Truly Local” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (Sept. 2001) (describing “the insidious effects
of informal but ingrained responses to gender-based violence” in state courts as described in
Congressional testimony during the Violence Against Women Act authorization, and quoting “witness
Sarah Buel, a formerly battered woman, who at that time was an attorney with the Harvard Legal Aid
Bureau, [who] testified: ‘What terrifies me is that I don’t think things have changed very much in spite of
the fact that we do have laws and shelters.’ Her prepared testimony indicated that despite the laws that
have been passed, courts were not providing statutory relief in civil protection orders.”).
168. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
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